ETM2026-07-22_007
Encrypt The Mempool #007
2026-07-22 4 decisions 498 transcript lines
Transcript
- Anders Elowsson
Yup, too much
- Justin Florentine (Besu)
- Benedikt Wagner
Some other people are in another call
- Benedikt Wagner
There seems to be some confusion
- Anders Elowsson
Jannik had a agenda point
Call summary
Decisions
- •Two research directions confirmed: (1) naive PQ threshold encryption with CCA2, (2) Lucid + validator-whitelisted key publishers with cartelization analysis - 01:00:13
Highlights
- Crs Ceremony Approach:
- ·Jan: CRS-based silent scheme preferred over DKG — avoids fixing party set, allows validators to join non-interactively by publishing per-key group elements - 00:26:07
- ·Gottfried: CRS ceremony complexity varies greatly; powers-of-tau is uniquely composable/low-interaction; not all CRS types share that property - 00:31:54
- ·Benedikt: CRS ceremony for a non-PQ solution is high effort for something likely replaced soon; naive scheme more realistic to ship - 00:34:27
- Key Reveal Optionality:
- ·Lucid's market-based key-reveal deterrence deemed insufficient given MEV payoff variance; seeking protocol-level enforcement - 00:04:29
- ·Jannik: skeptical of enshrining a specific threshold scheme; cryptographic development still active, small validator committees are bribable/unobservably misbehaving - 00:43:27
- ·Consensus: Lucid's financial penalty for key withholding is probably not strong enough; stronger optionality protections needed - 01:00:13
- Threshold Encryption Naive Scheme:
- ·Benedikt: for small N parties, naive scheme (secret-share symmetric key, encrypt one share per party) is viable; ciphertext size linear in N - 00:09:23
- ·CCA2 security mandatory for encrypted mempools (committee acts as decryption oracle); naive scheme can be made CCA2 via hybrid encryption + one-time signature - 00:15:47
- ·Reusing validator BLS keys for encryption is non-PQ and problematic; future hash-based validator keys cannot serve as threshold encryption keys - 00:22:13
- ·With PQ, nothing materially better than the naive scheme currently exists; non-PQ silent/batching schemes require a CRS ceremony - 00:39:31
- Validator Whitelisted Key Publishers:
- ·Jannik: alternative to enshrined crypto — Lucid as-is but validators vote to whitelist trusted key-publisher entities - 00:43:27
- ·Gottfried: whitelist risks ossification — newcomers face chicken-and-egg problem gaining validator votes before proving reliability - 00:49:58
- ·Anders: validator voting on external entities creates cartelization pressure within the validator set; prior per-user trust model felt safer - 00:50:07
Action Items
- •Benedikt Wagner / research - Investigate how to achieve CCA2 security on the naive threshold scheme (hybrid encryption + one-time signature approach) - 00:17:02
- •Jannik Luhn - Further analyze validator-whitelisted key-publisher proposal: game theory, cartelization risk, builder behavior - 00:58:20
Key decisions
Consensus: Lucid's financial penalty for key withholding is probably not strong enough; stronger optionality protections needed
The meeting concluded that Lucid's financial penalty for key withholding needs to be strengthened.Two research directions confirmed: (1) naive PQ threshold encryption with CCA2, (2) Lucid + validator-whitelisted key publishers with cartelization analysis
The meeting confirmed two research directions for future development.Investigate how to achieve CCA2 security on the naive threshold scheme (hybrid encryption + one-time signature approach)
Benedikt Wagner was assigned to investigate CCA2 security on the naive threshold scheme.Further analyze validator-whitelisted key-publisher proposal: game theory, cartelization risk, builder behavior
Jannik Luhn was assigned to further analyze the validator-whitelisted key-publisher proposal.

