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ETM2026-08-12_008

Encrypt The Mempool #008

2026-08-12 3 decisions 503 transcript lines

Transcript

Call summary

Targets
  • •Encrypt The Mempool #9 — August 19, 2026 (without Justin; or skipped to #9 in 3 weeks) - 00:53:02
Decisions
  • •No decision yet on classical vs. post-quantum path; question escalated to client teams as primary gate - 00:29:26
Highlights
  • Dkg And Committee Design:
    • ·Shutter uses Boneh-Franklin IBE (threshold IBE, no batching); keepers prefix identity with sender address for CCA security - 00:08:11
    • ·DKG scheme and threshold encryption scheme must be co-designed — cannot isolate or swap independently - 00:09:34
    • ·Jannik: validator-sampled committees are easily bribed (purely rational economically); external committees with social reputation are viable outside the core protocol but not enshrined - 00:36:29
    • ·Two distinct failure modes: (1) selling/leaking keys early (front-running, hard to detect); (2) withholding keys (optionality, detectable via PTC in Lucid design) - 00:42:50
  • Post Quantum Vs Classical:
    • ·KZG-based DKG breaks entirely under quantum attack; single preprocessing step breaks binding classically thereafter - 00:03:47
    • ·Post-quantum schemes (MLDSA ~2.5KB sigs, ML-KEM ~1.5KB ciphertext overhead) too large for practical mempool use today - 00:06:03
    • ·Consensus: quantum break of threshold encryption removes mempool privacy only; does not enable signature forgery — lower severity than other quantum threats - 00:12:16
    • ·Jan argues classical-only is acceptable risk: quantum computers would attack higher-value targets first; encrypted mempool can be voted off if threat materializes - 00:29:26
    • ·Gottfried: client teams (implementers) should decide if they're willing to build a non-post-quantum-secure interim solution — their answer gates the entire path - 00:54:33
  • Whitelist And Enshrined Design:
    • ·Jannik: non-enshrined approach (out-of-protocol threshold encryption) sidesteps post-quantum debate entirely; allows faster iteration - 00:35:12
    • ·Anders: EIP-8105 trusted-set design extended with directed-graph construction to achieve censorship resistance via highest top-block-fee canonical set - 00:57:50
    • ·Whitelist (validator-voted) design achieves censorship resistance simply; optionality solved once early-decrypt problem is addressed - 00:58:19
  • Collusion Resilience And Accountability:
    • ·Cryptographic snitching and traitor-tracing schemes exist in literature but are highly theoretical, inefficient, and not practical for mempool use - 00:45:55
    • ·Jan: naive classical scheme may offer some traitor-tracing; proving collusion to others remains the hard unsolved problem - 00:48:43
Action Items
  • •Justin Florentine (Besu) - Poll client teams on willingness to implement a non-post-quantum-secure interim encrypted mempool solution - 00:54:33
  • •Anders Elowsson - Post directed-graph censorship-resistance design for EIP-8105 to Ethereum Magicians and socialize on Telegram - 00:59:43

Key decisions

  • No decision yet on classical vs. post-quantum path; question escalated to client teams as primary gate

    The decision to escalate the question to client teams as primary gate

  • Poll client teams on willingness to implement a non-post-quantum-secure interim encrypted mempool solution

    Client teams will be polled on their willingness to implement a non-post-quantum-secure interim solution

  • Post directed-graph censorship-resistance design for EIP-8105 to Ethereum Magicians and socialize on Telegram

    The directed-graph censorship-resistance design for EIP-8105 will be posted to Ethereum Magicians and socialized on Telegram

Links